Existing work has argued that precise international metrics and assessments, such as the Millennium Development Goals, induce governments to alter policies in pursuit of these metrics. In this paper, we explore the extent to which these effects alter the equilibrium composition of public goods provision.
Introduction
In September 2000, following the conclusion of the Millennium Summit, the UN General Assembly approved a declaration committing its members to "... spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty, to which more than a billion of them are currently subjected. We are committed to making the right to development a reality for everyone and to freeing the entire human race from want."
1 To this end, the Declaration advanced resolutions to achieve key numeric targets -for instance halving of the proportion of the population living on less than one USD per day, granting universal primary education for both boys and girls. Subsequent negotiations -notably a World Bank conference 'From Consensus to Action: a Seminar on the International Development Goals' and the Secretary General's 2001 report Road Map Towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration -instantiated these aims into the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Hulme, 2009) . Specific targets applied to eight areas: the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, the achievement of universal primary education, the promotion of gender equality, the reduction of child morality, the improvement of maternal health, combating HIV and malaria, the promotion of environmental sustainability, and the creation of a global partnership for development.
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In this paper, we assess the effect of the MDGs -specifically the goal related to universal primary education -on state behavior. As the UN itself attests, while there has been "[p]rogress on universal access to education...the goal remains unmet." Moreover, where there has been a rise in primary enrollment levels, this increase "may cause pressure on the capacity of schools and teachers to deliver a quality education." 3 Moreover, raw comparisons of primary enrollment rates over time leave doubt as to whether improvements are directly attributable to the MDGs, or are simply a result of confounding time trends.
Following Kelley and Simmons (2015) , we contend that precise international metrics and assessments, such as the MDGs, may have the effect of inducing governments to alter policies in a manner designed to improve their scores on these metrics. However, such efforts may yield perverse outcomes in equilibrium:
Governments may substitute resources, personnel and effort away from other (possibly normatively desirable) goals in order to achieve the metrics of performance delineated by the international community. We specifically examine the relationship between primary education enrollment rates (which were targeted by the MDGs) and secondary enrollment rates (which were not) to see if the relationship between these two public goods was skewed by international incentives.
We further argue that both the direct effect of international assessment (the promotion of primary education) and the indirect effect on the relationship between primary and secondary education will be moderated by the characteristics of targeted states. To be more precise, both effects should diminish as 1 domestic accountability rises. In states with accountable governments -i.e., in democracies with high levels of government transparency -the composition of public goods should reflect the desires of the electorate, at least to a greater extent than is true in autocracies or opaque states. Hence, (1) governments are likely to have less ability to boost the provision of any particular public good in response to global assessments, and (2) any attempt to substitute away from one public good to boost the provision of another is likely to induce a political cost.
In what follows, we first present a brief overview of the MDGs and their creation. We then develop our argument about the conditional effect of global assessment. Next, we link our paper to a wider literature on assessment and accountability, particularly with regard to the provision of education. We then describe our data and present our empirical analysis. Section 7 concludes.
The Millennium Development Goals
The MDGs consist of eight goals (see Table 1 ) which were promulgated by the UN, agreed to by such IFI's as the World Bank, and adopted by a variety of bilateral aid organizations. Each goal is mapped into one or more 'targets', which, in turn, is mapped into several numerical indicators which serve as a basis for assessment of progress. For instance, the goal we examine here -(2) universal primary education -is mapped into the task of "ensur [ing] that, by 2015, children everywhere ... will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling." Progress toward this target is assessed by primary education enrollment and completion rates, as well as the literacy rate of 15-24 year-olds, broken down by gender. (1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger (2) achieve universal primary education (3) promote gender equality and empower women (4) reduce child mortality (5) improve maternal health (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases (7) ensure environmental sustainability (8) develop a global partnership for development Many of these goals were drawn directly from the UN's Millennium Declaration, which was issued and approved by the General Assembly as the culmination of the Millennium Summit, held in September of 2000.
5 The more precise indicators, and several of the more general goals, were only agreed upon during a World Bank conference, 'From Consensus to Action: a Seminar on the International Development Goals,' held in 2001 (Hulme, 2009 The IDGs were originally promulgated by the OECD in 1996 as part of an effort to shape the aid policies of member-states. In content, they were very nearly identical to the MDGs. The targets were set by rich-world donors, with fairly minimal input from aid recipients, and were constructed to appeal to domestic audiences in the developed world (Hulme, 2009) . In particular, the goals were intended to focus on concrete measures that appealed to a broad audience (e.g., poverty reduction through economic growth, gender equality). Moreover, these goals were thought to advance a degree of accountability on the part of recipient states (Hulme, 2009 We examine the effects of the MDGs through the lens of existing theories of political accountability. We focus on the goal pertaining to primary education, in part because the mapping between this goal and a numeric indicator was particularly precise, and in part because measures of closely related public goods (secondary and tertiary enrollment rates) were not targeted by the MDGs.
Global Assessment Power and Public Goods Production
The MDGs represented a very pubic international commitment by governments to achieve gains in the provision of specific public goods. As such, they increased the power of government incentives with regard to the provision of these goods. 7 Governments, therefore, would be likely to devote greater personnel, material resources, and effort toward providing these specific public goods once the MDGs were in effect.
However, these incentives have a secondary effect -governments are likely to divert resources from the production of other public goods in order to achieve MDG goals.
First, consider the effect of the MDGs on government incentives. Kelley and Simmons (2015, 55) argue that the dissemination of international standards may exert social pressure on governments to achieve certain policy outcomes, and that such standards are particularly likely to do so if "they are based on systematic monitoring, are comparative (and especially quantitative), are wielded by a respected actor or group/organization of actors, and are widely disseminated." Perhaps no set of international standards 6 Annex to "Road Map Towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Develop- 7 The power of incentives over production refers to the extent to which provider welfare is linked to realized production levels.
Incentive scheme a is more high powered than incentive scheme b if, under scheme a, the first partial derivative of provider welfare with respect to production levels is systematically higher than is the case under incentive scheme b.
meet these criteria as well as the MDGs. These standards were (1) explicitly linked to precise statistical targets; 8 (2) were subject to annual monitoring by the UN and other donor organizations; (3) were initially linked to the Millennium Declaration, and thus approved by the UN General Assembly and its constituent member-states, but subsequently promulgated jointly by the World Bank, IMF and OECD (Hulme, 2009);  and (4) were widely disseminated through public statements by these agencies as well as bilateral lenders.
As is emphasized by Kelley and Simmons (2015) , international standards like the MDGs may affect government behavior through a variety of channels. Perhaps the most direct of these is via domestic politics. Global indicators may serve to inform residents of monitored states, in a readily digestible manner, of the quality of their government's performance with respect to certain policy goals. Individuals within these states might use such information to discipline government behavior either through the ballot box (Besley and Burgess, 2002) , or through protest or collective action (Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland, 2015) . A well-developed literature finds that such information enables citizens to hold their leaders accountable for pubic goods provision (see, for instance, Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2003; Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Peters and Welch, 1980) , which, in turn, induces leaders to more actively provide public goods (see, for instance, Adserà, Boix and Payne, 2003; Besley and Burgess, 2002; Glaeser and Goldin, 2006; Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland, 2014; Reinikka and Svensson, 2003) . [Though, Chong et al. (2010) introduce a cautionary note as to these effects.] Hence, government leaders should face greater domestic pressure to achieve specific public goods targets once the MDGs are promulgated.
Global standards may also alter behaviors in the international or intergovernmental realm. The creation of a common set of international standards may facilitate decentralized enforcement through bilateral sanctioning or a withdrawal of bilateral benefits (Milgrom and North, 1990; Johns, 2012) . This was a particular risk with regard to the MDGs, given that the Goals were explicitly endorsed by most bilateral development agencies soon after their promulgation -with the US as a notable hold-out (Hulme, 2009 ). Alternatively, standards may be enforced through material sanctions (or withdrawal of benefits) by international bodies. Lebovic and Voeten (2009) , for instance, demonstrate that the World Bank enforced international standards of human rights, and was less willing to lend to countries that had been 'shamed' by the UNCHR.
This danger, again, would seem particularly acute for governments that failed to make progress on the MDGs, given the central role both the World Bank and IMF played in the construction of the Goals.
Finally, international standards may alter government incentives by generating global norms of acceptable behavior (Risse and Sikkink, 1999 primitive preferences over public goods allocations -or shift their strategies for regime legitimation.
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In this paper, we do not attempt to adjudicate between the mechanisms through which the MDGs increased the power of government incentives to provide specific public goods. Any or all of the above mechanisms may be in effect, and other, unlisted, mechanisms may also be at work. It is merely our contention that the MDGs had the effect of increasing the incentive to provide the specific public goods delineated in the Goals. We particularly focus on the goal of universal primary education. Also, unlike these earlier works, we emphasize the heterogeneity of government responses to these incentives -particularly heterogeneity induced by differences in government transparency.
While we contend that the MDGs had the (normatively desirable) effect of increasing government incentives to provide specific public goods, we further contend that they had the (normatively dubious) effect of causing governments to substitute away from efforts not delineated by the UN. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) argue that, when a given agent is faced with a multiplicity of tasks, some of which are monitored and others of which are not, the agent will rationally devote a disproportional level of effort to those goals which are subject to monitoring. In essence, governments have an incentive to 'game the system,' to meet the narrow standards laid out by the international community while neglecting related services. Such behavior has been widely documented in the literature on government accountability, in which democratic governments may have an incentive to focus their efforts on the provision of readily observable public goods (Mani and Mukand, 2007) , a tendency that has been particularly documented in the provision of education (Harding and Stasavage, 2014) . 10 It is for this reason that low-powered incentives are argued by some to be preferable over high-powered for certain types of public services, for instance with regard to certain bureaucratic tasks or teaching (Acemoglu, Kremer and Mian, 2007; Tirole, 1994) .
We therefore focus on government's tendency to provide a public good listed in the MDGs -i.e., primary education -relative to its tendency to provide a public good that is not so-listed -i.e., secondary education.
It is important to note that secondary education does not act as a counterfactual in our analysis. MDGs alter the relative provision of primary and secondary education, boosting the former while reducing the latter.
This tendency may be somewhat offset to the extent that various public goods are complements in production. For instance, increasing primary enrollment and completion rates perforce increases the pool of students eligible for secondary education. Analogously, expanding the provision of certain vaccinations may reduce the marginal cost of providing others, or other forms of healthcare. However, the substitution effect should dominate provided these complementarities in production are not too large.
There may also be an income effect produced by international aid, even when it is targeting a specific metric or rendered "in kind" (i.e., building schools instead of providing money). In this case, we might expect to see an increase in secondary enrollment enabled by freed-up resources newly available to a government. Even if these complementarities are large, however, the provision of the public good measured assessed by the MDGs (e.g., primary education) should increase disproportionately relative to the provision of goods not so-measured (e.g., secondary education).
Ironically, the very characteristic that make the MDGs valuable in terms of increasing accountability also render them particularly prone to this substitution effect. Because they focus on precisely defined quantitative metrics of performance, with regard to very specific public goods, they are particularly prone to 'gaming.' More nebulous or qualitative goals, which are less susceptible to monitoring and less useful for the types of comparisons that give global assessments their power (Kelley and Simmons, 2015) , are also likely to be less prone to substitution effects. However, such weak assessments are also less likely to alter government behavior at all.
The Moderating Role of Information and Institutions
We further contend that the effects of global assessment -both the direct (positive) effects on the provision of specific services and the indirect substitution effects on the provision of unassessed public goods -should be conditional on government institutions and the domestic informational environment. To be more precise, both effects should be weakened in instances where governments are highly accountable to domestic audiences. Highly transparent states and democracies should be less prone to alter the menu of public goods delivered by the government in response to global assessment than opaque autocracies.
Furthermore, the "income" effect documented above is more likely to manifest in accountable institutions where leaders exploit an increased budget to woo voters.
The rationale for this contention is twofold: First, and most directly, domestic and international accountability act as substitute mechanisms. Recall that one of the mechanisms though which global assessments might induce policy change works through such assessments' effect on domestic politics. Global monitoring may serve to inform domestic interests of their government's performance with regard to a particular policy area, inducing domestic demands for improved performance (Kelley and Simmons, 2015) . Naturally, however, if the domestic information environment is relatively rich, such information is superfluous. Citizens are already aware of their government's performance and any pressure to change policy as a result is likely to have already made itself manifest. Moreover, if the issue area in question is one of high public salience, or has important implications for domestic welfare, in democratic political systems, governments are likely to be induced to disclose information in response to electoral pressures (Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland, 2011) . Precisely because accountable governments face a strong domestic pressure to provide public goods, increased international demands are likely to have minor effects.
The second reason we expect global assessments to have a relatively minor effect on governments with a high level of domestic accountability is more subtle. Any shift in the composition of public goods, or in taxation, in such regimes is likely to be politically costly. Domestic pressure, by virtue of political accountability, is likely to ensure that the provision of public goods and taxes is ex ante desirable, from the perspective of the government's winning coalition. Put another way, one can imagine a production possibility frontier for a given government's public goods provision. Accountable governments are likely to be pushed to, or near, that frontier -and the point that is chosen on that frontier is likely to be dictated by the demands of the winning coalition. Unaccountable governments, by contrast, are less constrained, and so exist far from this production frontier. They thus enjoy greater latitude to increase public goods production -thereby sacrificing rents -and/or shift the composition of public goods provision -substituting one public good for another -without paying a political price (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003) .
Accountable governments, therefore, likely pay a high marginal cost for responding to international demands in terms of political survival. Unaccountable governments also pay a cost, in terms of diminished rent-seeking, but suffer more limited setbacks in terms of alienating their winning coalitions. Since political survival is the sine qua non for political leaders, the marginal cost of reacting to international demands is higher for accountable governments and lower for unaccountable. Unaccountable leaders are therefore most likely to react to international pressure.
These two forces complement one another. Either because they are already satisfying domestic demands for public goods provision, and the public is already aware of governments' efforts in this regard, or because they face high political costs from either increasing taxes or shifting policy focus, accountable governments are particularly unlikely to respond to global assessments. By contrast, in opaque polities, global assessments may play a role in informing the public of their government's poor performance in public goods provision. Moreover, leaders in such states may be willing to sacrifice some rents to increase the provision of public goods in response to international pressure. In the process, they will also likely cut back on the provision of other government services, since these are only provided at the minimal level consistent with political stability. Both the direct and indirect effects of global assessment are therefore most visible in under unaccountable rule.
Existing Literature
This paper speaks most directly to a recent literature on global assessment (Kelley and Simmons, 2015) .
The mechanisms through which international standards may influence government policy have also been elaborated by an extensive literature in international relations, particularly relating to human rights. State behavior in 'naming and shaming' for upholding international standards has been examined by HafnerBurton and Tsutsui (2007) and Lebovic and Voeten (2006) . (Though, see Nielsen and Simmons (2009) on where such behavior is lacking.) Risse and Sikkink (1999) examine how such standards of appropriateness may influence leaders, while Sikkink (2011) examines how international communities of individuals and non-governmental actors may shape state policy. Lebovic and Voeten (2009) demonstrates that international standards in the realm of human rights can shape the lending policies of international financial institutions, while Hafner-Burton (2005) demonstrates that these standards can be given teeth when instantiated in bilateral agreements. Simmons (2009) argues that international pressure can shape domestic political agendas, by mobilizing domestic interest groups and playing a role in legislative agenda setting.
We also borrow heavily from a literature on the determinants of political accountability. In particular, we draw on a literature on information and government accountability to understand how global assessments might influence government service provision (Adserà, Boix and Payne, 2003; Besley and Burgess, 2002; Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland, 2014) . We also draw our understanding of the marginal costs of shifting the composition of public goods from this literature (see, particularly, Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003) .
Our arguments about substitution effects also draw from a literature on accountability, particularly from works on multitask principal-agent problems (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) . Several existing works document the manner in which high-powered incentives can distort behavior in such models (Acemoglu, Kremer and Mian, 2007; Tirole, 1994) -and extensions examine the particular issues this might pose for political accountability (Bueno de Mesquita, 2007; Mani and Mukand, 2007) . Other, related, works examine the incentives for governments to obfuscate in light of such incentives (Conrad, Hill and Moore, 2014; Kono, 2006; Rejali, 2009 ).
Finally, our specific focus on education policy also has parallels in the literature. Most directly, Harding and Stasavage (2014) examine the distorting effects of electoral incentives in education provision, and argue that, when faced with electoral pressure, African governments in recent years have abolished primary school fees. Such actions are highly observable and hence draw political support, whereas, they argue, electoral pressures provide scant incentive to increase flow of government resources to schools, because this is difficult for voters to observe. Relatedly, Stasavage (2005) finds that democratization increases the provision of primary education in Africa, and diminishes incentives to provide secondary education.
Empirics Data
We draw our definitions of primary and secondary enrollment rates from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics. 11 Primary enrollment rates are defined as the total number of children of official primary school age who are enrolled in primary education divided by the total population of official primary school age. Secondary and tertiary enrollment rates are defined as analogously and are combined in our data (and our analysis). The UNESCO data contain a non-trivial number of missing observations. We drop country panels with fewer than 10 years of data and impute missing values for the remaining country panels using the Amelia II package for .
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After dropping countries with fewer than 10 years of data, we are left with 114 countries with data from 1980 to 2010. We merge this dataset with the transparency data from Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland (2014) which includes additional information -importantly the annual change in real GDP -drawn originally from the Penn World One issue with both the primary and secondary enrollment rate data is that they are subject to ceiling effects. While neither enrollment figure is strictly bounded above by 100% -if, for instance, children enroll in primary education at ages below 6 years, the primary enrollment figure may exceed 100% -in practice, neither figure can substantially exceed 100%. To diminish the risk that ceiling effects may produce non-linearities in our relationships of interest, we first scale all enrollment figures relative to their maximum values (such that all fall on the [0, 1] interval) and then apply a logistic transformation to these data. Denote p 2 [0, 1] as the rescaled enrollment figure, we then transform this measure by ln( p 1 p ). We apply this transformation to all enrollment figures in our dataset (primary, secondary, and -for some analysestertiary).
To measure government accountability, we rely on two measures. The first of these captures political institutions, namely democracy. We draw our measure of democracy from the Democracy and Development Revisited dataset (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010) , which codes a binary indicator democracy 2 {0, 1} equal to one if both legislative and executive posts are filled by meaningful elections.
Our second measure of accountability measures the informational environment of a given countryyear. Our measure of this concept is the HRV index of government transparency (Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland, 2014) . The HRV index is a continuous measure, derived from an item-response model of data missingness. It captures the tendency of the government to disclose credible information, pertinent to economics and citizen welfare, to the public. 
Estimating the Direct Effect of the MDGs
We begin by estimating the direct effect of the MDGs on primary enrollment rates. That is, we start by parsing the evidence that the MDGs increased the growth rate of primary enrollment, across countries. To do so, we estimate a varying intercepts hierarchical model of the following form:
where
where denotes the difference operator, i indexes country, and t indexes year. By first differencing the outcome term, we eliminate country specific factors that drive the level of primary education as potential confounds from the specification. In controlling for country (↵ i ) and year (⌧ t ) random effects, we help to adjust for random variations in the growth rate in enrollment figures across countries and time.
Our hypotheses are reflected in the j coefficients. If countries increase the rate at which they enroll new students in primary education following the MDGs, it should be the case that 1 > 0. Our moderating hypotheses -that any such effect of the MDGs should diminish in transparent and democratic politiesimply that 2 , 3 < 0.
We should emphasize that any results produced from this analysis are associational -we cannot rule out the possibility that changes other than the MDGs would drive a break in the rate of change of enrollment rates in the year 2000. However, these results do provide a preliminary test of our empirical hypotheses.
Results from the model specified in equation 1 are presented in Table 3 . Table 3 reveals that coefficients on the MDG dummy is positive across the board and statistically significant at conventional levels. Descriptively, these results indicate that the change in primary enrollment rates was, year-on-year, consistently more positive following the Millennium Declaration, conditioning on countries, years, and country-specific cubic trends. However, our motivating theory would posit that, failing to control for the confounding effects of transparency and electoral accountability, our estimating equation is inaccurate.
Column 2 updates the specification with these controls. Specifically, we control for transparency and accountability linearly. The resulting estimate on the MDG dummy now approaches conventional levels of significance while the electoral accountability measure is significant and positive. However, we still are not * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
properly specifying a linear model in line with our theoretical motivation. To accurately reflect our intuition, we turn to interaction effects, as displayed in columns 3 through 5.
Here we see suggestive evidence supporting our theoretical framework. Namely, across specifications the MDG dummy is significant and positive. We further note that the conditional effect of MDGs declines with both accountability and transparency. Results from equation 1 are thus consistent with our hypotheses: (1) The MDGs are associated with an increase in primary enrollment rates, (2) this effect is diminished in accountable (and particularly in transparent) states.
However, this analysis clearly does not establish causality. As an additional test, we replicate the model specified in equation 1, substituting secondary and tertiary enrollment rates for primary. These results offer some preliminary evidence as to our substitution hypothesis and also offer some evidence as to whether we can interpret the results from Table 3 as causal. Table 4 presents the results, with strong evidence of a more powerful -and positive -association between the Millennium Declaration and enrollment rates enrollment rates for secondary and higher education.
Here we see a much stronger relationship that is robust to specification. The coefficient on MDGs is consistently significant and 3 to 5 times the size of the coefficient from the primary enrollment rate regression. Interestingly, we still see negative coefficients on the interaction terms, suggesting that positive coefficient on the MDG indicator is attenuated as countries become more transparent and more democratically accountable. However, the interaction specification is significant at conventional levels only for the transparency measure.
These results call into question a causal interpretation of Table 3. 14 While the MDGs may well cause an 14 We also estimate Bayesian changepoint models on the primary education time-series. These models reveal that some countries experience a change-point at some point in the 1990-2000 period, with a cluster of countries experiencing changes around the release of the MDGs. However, a number of countries experience changes in the time-series as substantially earlier * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
increase in both primary and secondary enrollment rates by virtue of the complementarities in production between these two public goods, it is implausible to imagine that the MDGs had a larger effect on the unassessed good (secondary/tertiary enrollment) than the measured one (primary education). They also call into question our hypothesis regarding substitution effects. It seems likely that both sets of results are confounded by other changes post-2000. However, they are at least consistent with some positive effect dates.
from the MDGs.
These results do not, however, demonstrate that the same countries that increase their primary enrollment rates post-2000 also increase their secondary enrollment rates. To test this relationship, we turn to characterizing the country-level substitution from secondary enrollment to primary in our data.
Estimating the Substitution Effect of the MDGs
To estimate the extent to which governments substitute one public good (primary education) for another (secondary education) as a result of the MDGs, we turn to an error correction model (ECM). Developed to deal with cointegrated time-series, ECMs postulate a long-term equilibrium relationship between covariates -here primary and secondary education (Beck and Katz, 2011) . We are interested in changes in this longterm equilibrium. Specifically, we estimate a model of the form:
where,
where, as in equation 1, is the difference operator, i denotes country, t denotes year, P is the primary enrollment rate, and S the secondary. M 2 {0, 1} is an indicator taking the value 1 after the year 2000.
Equation 2 can readily be rewritten as follows:
where P i,M,t 1 i,M S i,M,t 1 denotes the equilibrium relationship between primary and secondary education. When P i,M,t 1 = i,M S i,M,t 1 , the system is in equilibrium, and primary enrollment rates will not tend to adjust. Given a < 0 (which is the case in all estimates), when primary education exceeds its equilibrium target (P i,M,t 1 > i,M S i,M,t 1 ) it will tend to decline. By contrast, when primary education falls below its equilibrium level (P i,M,t 1 < i,M S i,M,t 1 ), primary enrollment rates will tend to rise.
Since we are interested in changes in the equilibrium relationship between primary and secondary education, we examine changes in the i,M parameter before and after the introduction of the MDGs, and variation in this term across countries. We do so via a two-stage process. First, we estimate equation 2, which gives us estimated values of i,M . We then regress these parameters on an indicator for the MDGs, average transparency levels across the period, average democracy scores across the period, and the logged per capita GDP measure at the time of the Millennium Declaration.
15 That is, we estimate a model of the form:
Our substitution hypothesis holds that ! 1 < 0 -the equilibrium level of secondary education, relative to primary, declines once the MDGs go into effect. Our moderating hypotheses hold that ! j , j 2 {2, 3, 4} > 0 -the substitution effect is diminished in accountable polities. Estimates from equation 4 are presented in Table 5 .
function of transparency and democracy. Since i,M = 1 ⇣i,M this would be equivalent to our two-step procedure, save only that the uncertainty in the estimates of ⇣ would be factored into the estimation. We are currently running such an alternative specification. Notes: Regression of substitution measure on country-level predictors. Standard errors clustered at the country-level presented in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
As suggested by Table 5 , the Millennium Declaration had an effect on the signatories but one that perverted the intended purpose of the declaration. Specifically, countries who signed the Declaration were more likely to see a divergence of primary and secondary enrollment rates, suggesting a substitution effect (as indicated by the statistically significant negative coefficient in column (1)). Prior to the MDGs, there exists an equilibrium relationship between primary and secondary education, which breaks down ( is indistinguishable from zero) after the MDGs go into effect.
However, this substitution effect is mitigated by democratic accountability, with the interaction term in column (2) entering positive and significant. A similar effect is documented with transparency, where the substitution effect is reduced in countries with higher levels of transparency. [Interestingly, the coefficients on both the democracy and transparency terms themselves are negative, indicating that, before the MDGs, accountable governments had a higher equilibrium level of primary relative to secondary education than unaccountable states. This is consistent with existing claims, notably by Stasavage (2005) .] Combining these specifications suggests that the moderating effect is driven primarily by transparency, not electoral accountability. Figure 2 plots the linear marginal effects presented in Table 5 . 
Conclusion
To what extent can international initiatives alter country behavior? Existing research has argued that these initiatives can have an effect, particularly where the metrics are precise and tied to aid. This paper con-tributes to this literature by exploring how these initiatives impact not just their specific target but the larger equilibria levels of public goods provision. We argue that countries with finite resources must trade-off between different public goods and that their ability to do so is constrained by their institutions.
In our specific context, we document a substitution effect in which countries experience a shift away from secondary enrollment rates and toward primary following their adoption of the Millennium Declaration which targets, among other things, universal primary education. We further find that this substitution effect is stronger in more opaque countries but not in less democratically accountable countries. We argue that our findings support the simple premise that resource-constrained governments (1) do respond to international initiatives but (2) behave in ways that can potentially pervert the intentions of these initiatives.
Our findings are robust to specification and are likely conservative for two reasons: First, without controlling for MDG-related foreign aid, we omit an unobserved confound that theoretically attenuates the substitution mechanism. In our appendix, we conduct a sensitivity analysis to estimate how strong the partial correlations would have to be in order to undermine our results.
A Outliers
In the following section, we present additional results from our preliminary analysis. We begin with an analysis of outliers that potentially drive our main results. We look for evidence of outliers with two related techniques. For the primary and secondary enrollment data, we randomly drop 10% of the dataset over 1,000 simulations and re-estimate model (4) from Tables 3 and 4 . We extract the estimated coefficients on the Millennium Declaration, as well as its interaction with transparency and democracy measures. We then plot these coefficients as densities where the x-axis indicates the coefficient estimate. Figure 3 shows these robustness results for primary and secondary enrollment. We conduct a very similar analysis for the substitution specification except instead of dropping 10% of the data at random, we drop each country in turn. Figure 4 plots the densities for the Millennium Declaration as well as its interaction with transparency and democracy measures. As above, we are reassured by the robustness of our results to outliers, suggesting that our findings are not driven by a particular country. 
B Sensitivity Analysis
We also explore the extent to which our results are sensitive to confounding. As discussed in the conclusion, the Millennium Development Goals were tied to aid. While we believe the omission of this control makes our estimates conservative, we run a simulation to understand the level of correlation between our treatment (MDG) and outcome (substitution) that would undermine our results. We follow CITE IMBENS and generate a confounding variable that is correlated with both treatment and outcome and re-estimate the coefficient of interest. Figure 5 presents the results for the Millennium Declaration variable. We note that confounding would have to be very strong (correlations with the substitution effect and MDG more than 10 times as strong as per capita GDP) in order to yield estimates outside of our original 95% confidence interval. that confounded estimates of the relationship between the MDG indicator and the substitution measure are within the 95% confidence interval of the original estimate. Light gray circles indicate estimates that are in the bottom 2.5% of the t-distribution while dark gray circles represent those in the top 2.5% (above the 97.5th percentile). We include the control measure of per capita GDP for reference.
We re-run this analysis focusing on the interaction coefficients and find even more reassuring results ( Figure 6 ) We note that our coefficient on the interacted relationship for the MDG and transparency is even less sensitive to confounds and the estimate the democracy interaction is totally insensitive. The latter result makes sense given that we do not find a statistically significant relationship in the data for the interacted relationship with democracy and MDGs after controlling for transparency. Taken together, these results constitute reassuring evidence that our main results are not sensitive to omitted variables. that confounded estimates of the interacted relationship between the MDG dummy and either democracy (left) or transparency (right) and the substitution measure are within the 95% confidence interval of the original estimate. Light gray circles indicate estimates that are in the bottom 2.5% of the t-distribution while dark gray circles represent those in the top 2.5% (above the 97.5th percentile). We include the control measure of per capita GDP for reference.
C Causality
In our main results, we find a positive relationship between the Millennium Declaration and primary enrollment, suggesting countries responded to the MDGs. We can frame this result as a causal effect if we appeal to the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA). This claim relies on the assumption that, after controlling for both observed and unobserved potential confounds via the random effects in the multilevel model, the increase in primary school enrollment rates can be attributed to the release of the MDGs. There are ample reasons to question this claim. We use Bayesian Change Point analysis to let the data determine when the primary and secondary school enrollment rates exhibited a discontinuous shift. This analysis is applied to each country in isolation, yielding Figure 7 which plots the density of change points over time. We see two separate periods of discontinuous change, one during the late 1980s / early 1990s and a second around the time of the Millennium Summit.
The suggestion of a shift in primary school enrollment rates corresponding to the period in which the initial conversations regarding what would eventually become the MDGs is interesting and highlights the problematic assertion that the release of the MDGs "caused" changes in enrollment rates. Nevertheless, the appearance of a cluster of change points around the time of the MDGs suggests that the Millennium Declaration corresponded to a change in enrollment rates, at least for a subset of the countries. Notably, this clustering is driven primarily by countries with low levels of primary enrollment (below 70). This suggests that MDGs were particularly impactful on the very countries they were designed to target (i.e., those with low primary enrollment rates). 
D Subsets of the Data
Finally, we re-test our main analyses using subsets of the data. We focus only on countries with per capita GDP measures below $1,000 and $13,000. Our results are robust to these restrictions in terms of coefficient sign and magnitude although we suffer from small samples in the most restrictive dataset. Nevertheless, we find support for our main findings among the low and middle income countries. The tables on the following pages summarize these findings, along with similar simulations to those presented above. Notes: Multi-level model analysis allowing for random effects by country and year. Lagged secondary and tertiary enrollment rate and cubic country-specific time trends not shown. Standard errors presented in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Notes: Multi-level model analysis allowing for random effects by country and year. Lagged secondary and tertiary enrollment rate and cubic country-specific time trends not shown. Standard errors presented in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Figure 9: Robustness to outliers. Plots indicate the distribution of coefficient estimates over 1,000 simulations in which 10% of the dataset is dropped at random, focusing only on countries with a per capita GDP of less than $13,000 in the year 2000. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
